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1. INTRODUCTION 
Although the right to education is little known as a human 
right, it has a solid basis in the intemationallaw on human rights. 
It has been laid down in several universal and regional human 
rights instruments. Examples are the Universal Dec1aration on 
Human Rights (Art. 26), the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Art. 2 of the First Protocol), 
the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education 
and the Intemational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (lCESCR) (Artic1es 13 and 14)1. Over the years, a number 
* This artiele is a revised and concentrated version of Fons COOMANS, 
"In Search of the Core Content of the Right to Education", in: A. CHAPMAN & 
S. RUSSELL (eds.), Core Obligations: Building a Framework Jor Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2002, pp. 217-246. 
1. See also, the Intemational Convention on the Elimination of AH Forms 
of Racial Discrimination (Art. 5(e(v)), the Convention on the Elimination of 
AH Forms of Discrimination against Women (Art. 10), the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (Arts. 28 and 29), the African Charter on Human Rights 
and Peoples' Rights (Art. 17), the Protocol of San Salvador to the American 
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of studies have been published regarding the important question: 
what does realisation of the right to education entail?2 However, 
liule intemational and national case-Iaw is available on the 
various dimensions of the right to education as a human right. 
This is partly due to the fact that econornic, social and cultural 
rights, the right to education being one of them, have been seen 
for a long time as 'secondary rights' compared to civil and 
political rights. Their so-called 'vague' wording, prograrnmatic 
nature and lack of justiciability have caused their second rank 
status among govemments and courts. These developments have 
contributed to a lack of common understanding of these rights in 
terms of the content of rights and the nature of states' obligations. 
For example, the relatively few cases decided by the European 
Court of Human Rights on the right to education and its rather 
limited interpretation of that right have contributed to the idea 
that the right to education, because of its resource-consurning and 
prograrnmatic nature, cannot be enforceable from the state. These 
traditional views about the legal nature of econornic, social and 
cultural rights have gradually given way to more recent and 
modem approaches that depart from the indivisibility of all 
human rights (civil and political and econornic, social and 
cultural). Efforts have been undertaken recently to strengthen 
implementation of economic, social and cultural rights by cla-
rifying their normative content in more detail and by specifying 
the nature and content of state obligations. Contributions to this 
Convention on Human Rights (Art. 13) and the African Charter on the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child (Art. 11). 
2. To mention just a few old and recent studies within the framework of 
the United Nations: Ch. AMMOUN, Study of Discrimination in Education, U.N. 
New York, 1957; K. TOMASEVSKI, U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Education, Preliminary Report on the Right to Education, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1999/49, and Progress Reports, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/6, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4I2002/60 and U.N. Doc. E/CN.412003/9. 
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chánge of perspective and approach have come from academics3 
and from the expert body that monitors implementation of the 
ICESCR, the UN Cornmittee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, in particular its General Comments (CESCR)4. It is 
interesting to note that the most important developments in the 
field of economic, social and cultural rights relate to achieving a 
stronger implementation of this particular treaty world-wide. The 
present artiele deals with these doctrinal trends and developments 
from a general perspective, and with the implementation of the 
right to education in particular. 
The present artiele aims at elarifying the normative content of 
the right to education and of the corresponding obligations of 
States. It focuses on the nature, meaning and scope of Artiele 13 
and 14 of the Intemational Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights which is the main universal treaty text that 
ineludes right to education as a human right5. These provisions 
are of great importance for setting up and maintaining educational 
systems in countries all over the world, because they cover a 
variety of aspects of the right to education, framed in terms of 
state obligations. Section 2 deals with the scope of the right to 
education as a human right and its special characteristics, in 
particular with regard to the ICESCR. In section 3 other relevant 
universal instruments will be discussed briefly. Section 4 deals 
with the concept of a core content of human rights, with particular 
3. See A. EIDE, C. KRAUSE, A. ROSAS (eds.), Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: a Textbook, second revised edition, Dordrecht, Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2001 and A. CHAPMAN & S. RUSSELL, Core Obligations: Building a 
Framework lor Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Antwerp, Intersentia, 
2002. 
4. These General Comments may be consulted at the Treaty Body Data 
Base of the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf . 
5. Intemational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
conc1uded 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976, 999 United 
Nations Treaty Series, 3. Spain is a State Party to this treaty since 27 July 1977. 
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attention for the core content of the right to education. Finally, 
section 5 discusses the feasibility of using a typology of state 
obligations ('to respect', 'to protect', 'to fulfil') in order to 
specify the nature of (mínimum) state obligations resulting from 
treaty provisions and as a mechanism to determine whether a state 
is complying with its obligations in relation to the 
implementation of the right to education. 
2. THE SCOPE AND MEANING OF ARTICLE 13 ICESCR 
The scope and meaning of Artiele 13 ICESCR will be 
analyzed here from the angle of the text of the Artiele itself, its 
legal history and, in addition, from the text of the General 
Cornrnent on the right to education, adopted by the CESCR in 
December 19996. A General Cornrnent is a non-binding, but 
authoritative interpretation of a treaty provision that also gives 
guidelines for the legislation, policy and practice of State Parties. 
With respect to the right to education as laid down in 
intemational docume!lts, two aspects can be distinguished. On the 
one hand, realisation of the right to education demands an effort 
on the part of the state to make education available and 
accessible. It implies positive state obligations. This may be 
defined as the right to receive an education or the social 
dimension of the right to education. On the other hand, there is 
the personal freedom of individuals to choose between state-
organised and private education, which can be translated, for 
example, in parents' freedom to ensure their children' s moral and 
religious education according to their own beliefs. From this 
stems the freedom of natural persons or legal entities to establish 
their own educational institutions. This is the right to choose an 
6. See General Cornment No. 13 on the right to education (Artic1e 13 of 
the Covenant), adopted by the CESCR during its twenty-first session, 
(December 1999), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/1O. 
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education or the· freedom dimension of the right to education. It 
requires the state to follow a policy of non-interference in private 
matters. It implies negative state obligations. Both aspects can be 
found in Artieles 13 and 14 ICESCR. Artiele 13(2) and Artiele 14 
cover the social dimension, while Artiele 13(3 and 4) embody the 
freedom dimensiono 
Speaking in terms of individual rights, the right to education 
has been defined in the European context as a right of access to 
educational institutions 'existing at a given time' and the right to 
draw benefit from the education received, which means the right 
to obtain official recognition of-the studies completed7. When 
Artiele 13 ICESCR was drafted, the UNESCO representative 
suggested the following definition of the right to education: 'The 
right of access to the knowledge and training which are necessary 
to full development as an individual and as a citizen'8, which is a 
rather broad and general definition. Both definitions refer to the 
social dimension of the right to education. 
The elements of the freedom of education are well expressed 
in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Artiele 13: the freedom of choice and the 
freedom toestablish. This aspect of freedom is typical for a 
democratic, pluralist society; its origin lies in ideas about respect 
for individualliberty. 
The right to education laid down in Artiele 13 ICESCR is a 
universal right, granted to every person, regardless of age, 
language, social or ethnic origin or other status. Artieles 13 and 
14 are rather comprehensive in comparison to other rights in the 
Covenant. They set _ out the steps to be taken by states in realising 
the right to education. This particularly applies to paragraph 2 of 
Artiele 13, which enumerates the separate steps with a view to 
7. Belgian Linguistic Case, Case relating to certain aspects of the laws on 
the use of languages in education in Belgium, Judgment of the European Court 
on Human Rights, 23 July 1968, Publications of the Court, Series A, vol. 6, 
p.31. 
8. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/SR.226, at 14 (4 May 1951). 
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achieving the full realisation of this right9. At issue here is the 
specific obligation of the state to make education available and 
accessible in a non-discriminatory way. In performing this duty, 
states have a degree of discretion within the limits of the 
standards set in Artiele 13 and the key provisions of Artiele 2(1). 
An important question here is which obligations may arise from 
these two provisions. In order to answer this question, an analysis 
needs to be made of the meaning of the terms 'to recognise' and 
'to respect' which designate the character and scope of the 
obligations in Artiele 13. 
(i) The undertaking "ta recagnise" the right ta educatian 
The drafting history of the Covenant in general and of Artiele 
13 in particular show that the use of the term 'to recognise' in that 
provision is elosely linked to the idea of progressive realisation. 
The opening words of the original draft for paragraph 2 of Artiele 
13 did not contain the term 'to recognise', but rather the ex-
pression 'it is understood'. It was subsequently changed into the 
elause 'The States Parties io the Covenant recognise', in order to 
have a term with a stronger legal significance1O. The meaning of 
the term 'to recognise' was expounded by the representative of 
UNESCO in 1951 during the preparatory work in the Com-
mission on Human Rights as follows: 'recognition meant first and 
foremost that States should accept the obligation to do all in their 
power to achieve certain elearly defined aims, without, however, 
undertaking to attain them in a specified periodo Admittedly, they 
could be achieved only by slow degress, and the time involved 
would vary according to the relative magnitude of the problems 
9. The present artiele does not deal with the aims of education laid down in 
Article 13(1). 
10. See U.N. Doc. NC.3/L.621, NC.3/L.625 and N3764 (Report of the 
Third Committee, 1957). 
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of eaeh eountry and the means at its disposal' 11. In order to stress 
the progressive nature of the obligation to realise the right to 
primary, seeondary and higher edueation, the elause 'with a view 
to aehieving the full realisation of this right' was added. This was 
believed to be neeessary, sinee it would be unrealistie to expeet 
that states would be eapable of realising these levels of edueation 
irnmediately 12. In short, the term 'to reeognize' does not mean the 
absenee or soft eharaeter of obligations for states: 'Rather 
reeognition triggers the applieation of general state obligations 
under Artiele 2(1)' 13. It should be stressed, however, that one 
should differentiate between sub-paragraphs 2(a) (primary 
edueation), 2(b) (seeondary edueation) and 2(e) (higher edu-
eation) of Artiele 13. The obligation eontained in sub-paragraph 
2(a) ('Primary edueation shall be eomplusory and available free 
to all') is uneonditional, plainly defined, without a referenee to 
progressiveness. Sub-paragraphs (b) and (e) eontain eonjugations 
of the verb 'to make' and this strenghthens their eharaeter of 
progressive realisation. That the legal obligation eontained in sub-
paragraph 2(a) is stronger can also be inferred from Artiele 14 
whieh is devoted to the implementation of eompulsory and free 
primary edueation for all for States Parties who have not yet 
reaehed that goal. The Cornmittee on Eeonomie, Social and 
Cultural Rights attaehes great value to the guarantee of eompul-
sory and free primary edueation. When diseussing, for example, 
the report of Zaire, the Committee made it elear that eharging fees 
for primary edueation is eontrary to Artiele 13, par. 2(a). A State 
Party eannot justify sueh a measure by referring to severe 
eeonomie cireumstanees: 'The provision of sueh edueation was 
11. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/AC.14/SR.1, at 14 (17 May 1951). 
12. U.N. Doc. A/3764 and Add. 1, para. 33 and 42. 
13. Ph. ALSTON and G. QUINN, "The Nature and Scope of States Parties' 
Obligations under the Intemational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights", in: Human Rights Quarterly, 9 (1987), pp. 156-229 at 185. 
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an obligation which remained incumbent upon a State Party 
whatever economÍc system it had adopted' 14. 
In its General Comment on Artiele 13, the CESCR defines 
Artiele 13(2) as the right to receive an education. It distinguishes 
between four interrelated and essential features of education, 
namelyl5: 
a) availability: functioning educational institutions and pro-
grammes have to be available in sufficient quantity in a State; 
b) accessibility: educational institutions and programmes have 
to be accessible to everyone, without discrimination, also im-
plying physical and economÍc accessiblity; 
c) acceptability: the form and substance of education, in-
eluding curricula and teaching methods, has to be relevant, 
culturally appropriate and of good quality; 
d) adaptability: education has to be flexible, so that it can 
adapt to the needs of changing societies and communities, and 
respond to the needs of students within their specific social and 
cultural context. 
This four "a" scheme is a useful device to analyse the content 
of the right to receive an education, as well as the general 
obligations for a State Party resulting from itl6. 
(ii) The undertaking "to respect" the freedom of education 
According to Artiele 13(3) States Parties undertake to have 
respect for the liberty of parents to choose other than public 
schools for their children and to ensure the religious and moral 
education of their children. The same obligation is encountered in 
14. U.N. Doc. E/C.1211988/SR.19, para. 10; see also E/C.1211988/SR.17, 
para. 27, 40, 41 and 48. 
15. General Comment no. 13, para. 6. 
16. This scheme has also been used by the Special Rapporteur on the right 
to education in her preliminary report, see U.N. Doc. E/CNA/1999/49, chapter 
11. 
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other international instruments such as the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (Art. 18(4), the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Art. 2 of the First Protocol) and 
the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education 
(Art. 5(1b)). At first sight, this obligation only has a negative 
meaning, i.e. a protection against state interference. From the case 
law of the Strasbourg supervisory bodies on Artiele 2 of the First 
Protocol to the European Convention, it can be coneluded, 
however, that the obligation 'to respect' should be interpreted in a 
positive sense as well; it requires a positive, tolerant attitude from 
the State towards the religious or philosophical convictions of 
parents when a State wants to introduce subjects into the public 
school curriculum which may interfere with those convictionsI7. 
The European Cornmission, for example, stated: 'Artiele 2 not 
only prohibits the State from preventing parents from arranging 
the education of their children outside the public schools, but also 
requires the State actively to respect parental convictions within 
the public schools. This requirement is then obviously not met 
simply by the observance by the respondent Government of the 
prohibition, and by the availability of private schools or alter-
native means of education other than the public schools'I8. A 
positive way to respect parental convictions is, for example, the 
granting of exemption for certain subjects of the curriculum. It is 
submitted that the term 'to respect' in Artiele 13(3) of the 
Covenant has a similar meaning. The character of the obligation 
'to respect' is such that it ensures a domain which is free from 
state interference. This type of obligation fits in well with 
obligations relating to the implementation of civil and political 
17. See the Case of Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen, Report of the 
Cornmission of 21 March 1975, Publications of the Court Series B, vol. 21, p. 
46. See also the Case of Campbell and Cosans, Judgment of the Court of 25 
February 1982, Publications of the Court Series A, vol. 23, p. 18. 
18. Case of Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen, Report of the 
Commission, at 44. ... 
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rights, such as the right to privacy and the right to family life. No 
further measures of implementation are required for it to function 
in the domestic legal order of State parties. It is of an irnmediate 
nature. 
Another element of the freedom of education is the liberty of 
individuals and bodies to establish and direct educational 
institutions outside the system of State schools. Artiele 13(4) does 
not contain the term 'to respect', but prohibits the state to 
interpret Artiele 13 in such a way that it interferes with this 
liberty, in other words violates such freedom. The functioning of 
this liberty within the domestic legal order of a State is subject to 
such minimum standard s as may be laid down by the State. It is 
evident that such standard s may not frustrate this freedom. In fact, 
this paragraph obliges the state in principIe to take a similar 
course of conduct as in the implementation of the obligation 'to 
respect' of paragraph 3. The term 'liberty' was expressly chosen 
over the term 'right' in order to ensure that Artiele 13(3) 'should 
not be understood as imposing upon States Parties to the 
Covenant the obligation to provide religious education in public 
schools' 19. 
3. OTHER RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
In this section I want to highlight briefly two universal treaties 
which contain extensive provisions on the right to education. The 
first instrument to be discussed is the Convention on the 
Elimination of AH Forms of Discrimination Against W omen 
adopted in 1979. The first sentence of Artiele 10 mentiones the 
purpose of this provision, namely an obligation for · States Parties 
to eliminate discrimination against women in order to ensure 
19. U.N. Doc. N3764 and Add.l, Report of the Third Committee of the 
General Assembly (1957), para. 47. 
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them equal rights with men in the field of education. In order to 
realise that goal States Parties must ensure, among others, on a 
basis of equality of men and women, access to the same curricula, 
the same examinations, teaching staff with qualifications of the 
same standard and school premises and equipment of the same 
quality. In addition, States Parties are under an obligation to take 
specific measures to meet the specific educational needs of girls 
and women, such as the reduction of female student drop-out 
rates and the organisation of prograrnmes for girls and women 
who have left school prematurely, and access to specific 
educational information relating to women's health and family 
planning. It is obvious from this Artiele that States Parties have 
positive obligations which may have drastic effects for those 
States in which discrimination of girls and women is a structural 
and systemic characteristic of society and every day life. 
The second instrument to be mentioned here is the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, adopted in 1989. The typical feature of 
obligations of States Parties resulting from this treaty is the idea 
that the best interests of the child must be the guiding principIe 
for measures taken for the care and protection of children (Artiele 
3(1)). Artieles 28 and 29 deal with educational rights of children. 
These provisions link up with the corresponding Artieles of the 
Universal Deelaration of Human Rights and the ICESCR. 
However, compared to these provisions the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child contains a number of special characteristics 
which deserve a brief discussion here. At first, Artiele 28(1a) puts 
more emphasis on the progressive realisation of the right to 
primary education (use of the verb 'to make'), while Artiele 
13(2a) and 14 of the Covenant are more mandatory and strict. 
Furthermore, Artiele 28(2) stipulates that States Parties shall take 
all appropriate measures to ensure that school discipline is 
administered in a manner consistent with the child's human 
dignity and in conformity with the present Convention. Such a 
provision is lacking in other instruments, with the exception of 
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Artiele 11(5) of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of 
the Child. Artiele 28(2) would imply, in my view, that corporal 
punishment at schools is contrary to the rights of the child. 
Artiele 28(le) emphasises the importance of regular school 
attendance and the reduction of drop-out rates, aspects which are 
also lacking in other instruments. Artiele 29(1) is more extensive 
and specific with regard to the aims of education in relation to the 
development of a child's personality. Finally, Artiele 32(1) 
provides for protective measures by the State against economic 
exploitation of children (child labour) which might impede their 
education. In conelusion, one may say that this Convention adds a 
number of important elements for the protection and education of 
children which mean a step forward on the way of securing their 
rights20. 
4. THE CONCEPT OF A CORE CONTENT OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL 
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 
4.1 The 'eore eontent' eoneept 
In this section, I want to make sorne general observations on 
the concept of a core content of economic, social and cultural 
rights, and illustrate these observations by identifying sorne 
elements of the core content of the right to education. 
It is well-known that economic, social and cultural rights have 
long been neglected in the human rights debate. This is partly due 
to the fact that, in the words of Philip AIston, their promotion and 
realisation require skills and expertise that are alíen to lawyers, 
diplomatic representatives, national policy makers, officials of 
intemational organisations and NGO representatives who have 
20. A comparative analysis of international provisions concerning the right 
to education may be found in a paper prepared by Mr. José L. GOMEZ DEL 
PRADO, U.N. Doc. E/C.l2/1998/23. 
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focused mainly on civil and political rights21 . Generally speaking, 
proper discussion of the core content of individual rights has 
started only sorne fifteen years ag022. The term 'core content' is 
to be regarded as a tiseful means or instrument in helping to 
analyse and clarify the normative content of economic, social and 
cultural rights, which are often described as vague and open-
ended, with a view to assess the conduct of states in this field in 
general, and to identify violations in particular. Thus, the analysis 
of this concept should not be regarded as an end in itself. The 
core content approach should also be seen as an answer to the 
notion of progressive realisation and resource availability that are 
part of Article 2(1) ICESCR. This notion may be used as an 
'escape clause' by states to delay or question realisation of 
economic, social and cultural rights. Within the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the body which supervises 
the implementation of the ICESCR by State Parties, there seems 
to be fairly general agreement on the use of the term 'core 
content'. The Committee has made explicit reference to the term 
on a number of occasions23 . During the ninth session of the 
21. Ph. ALSTON, "The importance of the inter-play between economic, 
social and cultural rights, and civil and political rights", in: Human Rights at 
the Dawn of the 21st Century, proceedings of the interregional meeting 
organised by the Council of Europe in advance of the World Conference on 
Human Rights, Strasbourg, 1993, pp. 59-74, at 65. See for an overview of 
developments regarding legal character, implementation, standard-setting and 
supervision, Fons COOMANS, "Economic, Social and Cultural Rights", in: SIM 
Special No. 16, Netherlands Institute of Human Rights, Utrecht, 1995, pp. 3-51 
and Fons COOMANS, "The Role of the UN Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights in Strengthening Implementation and Supervision of 
the Intemational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights", in: 
Veifassung und Recht in Übersee, 35 (2002), pp. 182-200. 
22. See, for example, B.C.A. TOEBES, The Right to Health as a Human 
Right in International Law, Intersentia-Hart: Antwerpen, Groningen, Oxford, 
1998, chapter V. 
23. See for example, Statement to the World Conference on Human Rights 
on behalf of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in: U.N. 
Doc. AlCONF.157/PC/62/Add.5, Annex 1, para. 16. 
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Cornmittee in Deeember 1993, a general diseussion was to be 
held on the right to health with particular emphasis on the idea 
that 'there is a minimum eore eontent of eaeh right which 
eonstitutes a "floor" below whieh eonditions should not be 
permitted to fall in any State Party'24. Likewise, the Cornmittee 
refers to the term in its General Cornment on Artic1e 2(1): '( ... ) 
the Cornmittee is of the view that a rninimum eore obligation to 
ensure the satisfaetion of, at the very least, rninimum essential 
levels of eaeh of the rights is ineumbent upon every State Party. 
Thus, for example, a State party in whieh any significant number 
of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, or essential 
primary health eare, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most 
basie forms of edueation is, prima Jacie, failing to diseharge its 
obligations under the Covenant. If the Covenant were to be read 
in sueh a way as not to establish sueh a rninimum eore obligation, 
it would be largely deprived of its raison d'etre'25. The 
Committee has also started to use the eoneept in general 
eornments on substantive rights, sueh as on food and edueation26. 
In the aeadernie literature, AIston has argued for the use of the 
term 'eore eontent', postulating that 'eaeh right must ( ... ) give rise 
to an absolute rninimum entitlement, in the absenee of whieh a 
State party is to be eonsidered to be in violation of its 
obligations '27. 
24. U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1993111, para. 5. 
25. The nature of States' parties obligations (Artiele 2, paragraph 1 
ICESCR), General Comment no. 3 (1990), D.N. Doc. E/1991/23, Annex III, 
para. 10. 
26. See U.N. Doc. E/C.1211999/5 and U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/1O. 1 will 
deal with elements of the core content of the right to education as set by the 
Committee in this General Comment later on. 
27. Ph. ALSTON, "Out of the Abyss: The Challenges Confronting the New 
U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights", in: Human Rights 
Quarterly, 9 (1987), pp. 332-381, at 353. See also the Advisory Report no. 18, 
"Economic, Social and Cultural Rights", of the NETHERLANDS ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOREIGN POLICY, The Hague, 
1994, at 10, 11. 
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As far as I am aw are , the basis for the core content approach 
has been developed and elaborated by Esin Orücü, a Turkish 
author who based her ideas on an analysis of the Gerrnan 
Constitution of 1949, the Turkish Constitution of 1961 and Dutch 
case law on the interpretation of the freedom of speech provision 
in the Dutch Constitution. First of all, one should define the scope 
of a right. The scope relates to all the elements covered by one or 
more treaty provisions dealing with a particular right. In her view, 
the norrnative scope of each right consists of three distinct parts: a 
core, a circumjacence and an outer edge. In other words, it is a 
concept with a layered structure. The core can be defined as 'an 
irreducible rninimum, ( .. ), for every right, which can be 
universally acceptable and used by all courts to protect the 
rninimum content of a right'. It deals with 'the unrelinquishable 
minima within the norrnative scope of that right'28. Artic1e 19 of 
the Gerrnan Grundgesetz, dealing with lirnitations of basic rights, 
provides in Section 2: 'In no case may the essence of a basic right 
be encroached upon'. This provision sets, in other words, a lirnit 
to lirnitations of rights. According to Orücü, the lirnit to 
lirnitations is the membrane distinguishing the core from the 
circumjacence: 'every limitation advances from the outer edge of 
the right towards its core, but at this membrane it has to stop'29. 
Another effort to c1arify the norrnative content of human rights 
by means of a core content approach was made during an 
interdisciplinary conference convened by the University of 
Fribourg (Switzerland) in 19893°. According to the conc1usions of 
this colloquium, the core of a human right corresponds to the 
28. E. ORÜCÜ, "The Core of Rights and Freedoms: The Lirnit of Limits", 
in: T. CAMPBELL, D. GOLDBERG, S. MCLEAN, T. MULLEN (eds.), Human 
Rights - from Rhetoric to Reality, Oxford, 1986, pp. 37-60, at 38,52. 
29. Orücü, at 48. 
30. See P. MEYER-BISCH (ed.), Le noyau intangible des droits de 
l'homme, Actes du VIIe Colloque interdisciplinaire sur les droits de l'homme a 
I'Université de Fribourg (23-25 novembre 1989), Fribourg, 1991. 
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concept of 'substance' of a right. The substance of a right may be 
determined according to two lines. The first way refers to the 
content of a right as an incompressible rninimum, while the 
second way defines the substance of a right as a threshold below 
which the integrity of human dignity is no longer respected31 . 
As far as econornic, social and cultural rights are concemed, 
perhaps Article 4 ICESCR can be of use to render the term 'core 
content' more specific and workable in practice. This Article 
provides for limitations to the enjoyment of the rights conferred, 
but imposes criteria for such lirnitations. They may not, for 
example, conflict with the nature of a right. In my view, the 
nature of a right must be understood as meaning its core or 
essence, i.e. that essential element without which a right loses its 
substantive significance as a human right32. This idea is also 
implicit in Article 5(1) of the Covenant which provides, inter 
alia, that lirnitations of rights to a greater extent than is provided 
for in the Covenant are not allowed. In fact, therefore, the core 
content embodies the intrinsic value of each human right. It is a 
non-variable element of a substantive right. The European Court 
on Human Rights has also stressed in a number of its judgments 
that 'lirnitations [of the right to have access to a court] applied 
must not restrict or reduce the access left to the individual in such 
a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is 
impaired'33. Thus there seems to be a link between the core 
31. Proceedings of the Fribourg Conference, at 238-242. 
32. See A.P.M. COOMANS, De Internationale Bescherming van het Recht 
op Onderwijs (The International Protection of the Right to Education), Ph.D 
Thesis, Maastricht University, Leiden, 1992, at pp. 38-39. See also "The 
Limburg PrincipIes on the Implementation of the Intemational Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1986)", U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1987/17, 
PrincipIe no. 56, also published in the Human Rights Quarterly 9 (1987), 
pp. 122-l35. 
33. ECHR, Ashingdane Case, 28 May 1985, Publ. Court Series A, Vol. 93, 
pp. 24-25 (emphasis added), Case of de Geouffre de la Pradel v. France, 16 
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content approach and certain aspects of the case law of the 
Strassbourg Court. 
The elements of a right which cannot be regarded as part of its 
core content (the 'peripherals' or circumjacence and outer edge) 
are not less important, but constitute - as it were - a derivative or 
consequence of the core content. The character of these elements 
is such that they can often be realised only progressively; for 
example, they impose on governments considerable (financial) 
obligations, which for many States are not current1y achievable. 
In addition, these peripheral elements are most1y less essential for 
the very existence of that right as a human right. 
The core content of a right should be universal; a country 
dependent core would undermine the concept of the universality 
of human rights. The question is of course whether the core 
content of a right should be general and abstract or detailed and 
concrete. My answer would be that a workable definition should 
be somewhere in between. In general terms the core of a right 
should be the same everywhere. However, it should be 'trans-
lated' or operationalised at the national or regionallevel, taking 
into account national or regional characteristics and circums-
tances and the specific needs of individual s and groups. However, 
from a conceptual perspective, the needs of the people and the 
available opportunities in a state should not determine the core of 
a right. It should rather be the other way around, starting with the 
right itself. 
In case the core of a right has been realised in a rich state 
without much difficulty, that would not mean that such a state 
may lean back and argue that it is complying with its treaty 
obligations. On the contrary, the task would then be to implement 
the peripheral part of the scope of a right. In other words, point of 
departure for a core content approach would be, in my view, the 
December 1992, Publ. Court Series A, Vol. 253-B, p. 41 and Fayed Case, 21 
September 1994, Publ. Court Series A, Vol. 294-B, p. 55. 
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concept of human dignity. The core of a right is to be considered 
as an expanding floor (not a fixed ceiling), or a bottom from 
which governments should endeavour to go up, trying to reach 
higher levels of realisation. This also creates a link to the idea of 
progressive realisation contained in Artiele 2(1) ICESCR that 
embodies a dynamic element, meaning that realisation does not 
stop when a given level has been reached. 
Complying with obligations which relate to the core of a right 
should not be dependent upon the availability of resources. In 
other words, when a . government is facing policy dilernmas as a 
result of limited or insufficient financial resources, priority should 
be given to the realisation of the core of a right. In this respect it 
is interesting to note here that the CESCR has qualified core 
obligations as non-derogable34. In conelusion, the content of a 
right determines the nature of state obligations, not the other way 
round. Indeed, the individual right (the norm) should be central. 
The norm, ineluding its core, gives rise to state obligations, part 
of them relating to the core (core obligations). Core obligations 
may be negative as well as positive. 
The core content approach to economic, social and cultural 
rights has nothing do with another issue often discussed in 
relation to these rights, that is their justiciability. Whether are not 
an economic, social or cultural is justiciable in a specific case, 
does not depend on identifying the core elements of that right. 
J usticiability is dependent on the characteristics of the domestic 
constitutional system of a country, the wording of the (treaty) 
provision that is invoked before a court, the characteristics and 
the facts of the case under review and the attitude of the judiciary. 
Consquently, core elements and peripheral elements of a right 
may equally be justiciable or non-justiciable. 
34. CESCR General Comment no. 14 (2000) on the right to the highest 
attainable standard of health, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4, para. 47 and CESCR, 
Statement on Poverty and the ICESCR, U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/200l/1O, para. 18. 
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4.2 Elements of the core content of the right to education 
First the scope of the right to education needs to be identified 
as all those elements of the right covered by human rights treaty 
provisions. That does not only include provisions dealing 
explicitly with the right to education, such as in the ICESCR, 
CRC and the European Convention on Human Rights, but also 
overlapping elements of other rights. Examples include the right 
to non-discrirnination, freedom of religion (respect for the 
religious convictions of parents concerning the choice of edu-
cation for their children), freedom of association (freedom to 
establish schools), right to privacy (free choice of education, 
without interference by the state), right to work (for teachers and 
the right to vocational training). 
Sorne of the elements which make up the core content of the 
right to education are stipulated in Articles 13 and 14 ICESCR. 
Other elements may be inferred from these provisions. 
Access to education on a non-discriminatory basis 
First, the essence of the right to education means that no one 
shall be denied a right to education. In practice, this means an 
individual right of access to the education available, or in more 
concrete terms, the right of access to the existing public edu-
cational institutions on a non-discrirninatory basis35. An example 
of a violation of this right is restricting access to the existing 
public educational institutions to people belonging to a specific 
ethnic, linguistic or religious group, for example the practice in 
sorne European countries of discrirninating against Romani 
35. Compare Article 2(2) ICESCR, Article 26 ICCPR and Limburg 
PrincipIes at 35 and 37. 
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children in getting access to certain types of education36. In 
addition, education provided for by the state should be of the 
same quality for all groups in society; girls, for example, should 
not be given education of an inferior quality compared to boys37. 
Another (extreme) example was the situation in Afghanistan 
where the Taliban regime banned girls and women from all types 
of educational institutions38. A more subtle case relates to the rule 
and practice in schools in sorne African countries to force female 
students to disclose their pregnancy and to leave the school once' 
the pregnancy has been discovered. This has been found 
discriminatory against women in a case before the Botswana 
Court of AppeaP9. 
The right to enjoy free and compulsory primary education 
A second element of the core content of the right to education 
is the right to enjoy primary education in one form or another, not 
36. See, Fons COOMANS, '.'Discrimination and Stigmatisation Regarding 
Education: The Case of the Romani Children in the Czech Republic", in: 
J. WILLEMS (ed.), Developmental and Autonomy Rights of Children: 
Empowering Children, Caregivers and Communities, Antwerpen, Intersentia, 
2002, pp. 225-250. 
37. See Article 1(1) UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in 
Education (1960) for a definition of the term 'discrimination in education'. In 
1996, the Kuwaiti Parliament adopted a bill which provided for the segregation 
of male and female students in higher educational institutions. In my view, this 
segregation will lead to discrimination of women, given the influence of 
Muslim groups in that country. See the Dutch daily newspaper NRC 
Handelsblad, 3 July 1996. 
38. See Human Rights Watch, 1999 World Report at 
http://www.hrw.org/worldreport99/women/women3html. See also the report of 
the U.N. Secretary-General on the situation of women and girls in Afghanistan, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000118. 
39. See on this case, E. K. QUANSAH, "Is the Right to Get Pregnant a 
Fundamental Right in Botswana?", in: Journal of African Law, 39 (1995), 
pp. 97-102. 
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necessarily in the form of traditional c1ass-room teaching. 
Primary education is so fundamental for the development of a 
person' s abilities that it can be rightfully defined as a mínimum 
c1aim40. For example, the Supreme Court of India has held the 
right to (primary) education to be implicit in the right to life 
because of its inherent fundamental importance41 . Intemational 
law on human rights does not define the term 'primary edu-
cation', but guidelines for using this concept and others have been 
developed within the framework of intemational organisations, 
such as UNESCQ42. Primary education relates to the first layer of 
a formal school-system and usually begins between the ages of 5 
and 7 and lasts approximately six years, but in any case no fewer 
than four years43. Primary education inc1udes the teaching of 
basic learning needs or basic education. The term 'basic 
education' is nowadays often used, for example within the 
framework of intemational conferences on education, such as the 
World Dec1aration on Education for All (Jomtien, Thailand 1990 
and Dakar 2000). Basic education relates to the content of 
education, not to the form (formal or non-formal schooling) in 
which it is presented. As has been laid down in the Jomtien 
Dec1aration: 'the focus of basic education must, therefore, be on 
actual learning acquisition and outcome, rather than exc1usively 
40. The Conclusions of the Fribourg Colloquium, referred to aboye 
(footnote 30), stipulate that 'the right to read and write, with respect for cultural 
identity, forms part of the core both of the right to education and of the right to 
information; it is guaranteed, as a rninimum, by the right to free and 
compulsory primary education' (p. 241). 
41. Unni Krishnan and Others v. State of A.P. and Others, 4 Febr. 1993, 
(1993) 1 SCC 645. 
42. See, for example, UNESCO's Statistical Yearbook and the Revised 
Recommendation concerning the Standardization of Educational Statistics 
(1978). 
43. UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1996, p. 3. See also the Prelirninary 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1999/49, paras.75-79 and A. Me1chiorre, At what age? .. , 2002, to be 
consulted at www.right-to-education.org . 
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upon enrolment, continued participation in organized pro-
grarnrnes and completion of certification requirements' (Artiele 
4). Apart from a school and elassroom system, basic education 
may be given in less traditional forms, such as village or 
cornmunity based, or in the open airo This may be necessary due 
to shortcomings of the formal schoolsystem (lack of adequate 
buildings, teaching material s or teachers), or because parents are 
unable to pay for participation in the formal schoolsystem. Basic 
education within the context of the right to primary education as 
an element of the core content of the right to education would, in 
my view, inelude literacy, numeracy, skills relating to one's 
health, hygiene and personal care, and social skills such as oral 
expression and problem solving44. In addition, basic education 
must also inelude sorne teaching of concepts and values as have 
been laid down in Artieles 26(2) of the Universal Deelaration of 
Human Rights, Artiele 13(1) of the Covenant and Artiele 29(1) 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, ineluding respect for 
human rights. One very important precondition for primary 
education as a core element is that education should respect the 
rights of minorities and in~igenous populations in the sense that it 
44. An example may illustrate the practice of basic education: in India, the 
Social Work and Research Centre (SWRC), an Indian ngo has been working 
with the poorest of India' s rural population. This ngo has set up a number of 
schools in which "children are made aware of their rights through songs, 
puppets and classroom theatre. The curriculum gives them an idea about 
language and reading and writing in Hindi, as well as the basics of 
mathematics. Then they make links between letters and words, and between 
words and phrases. Over the following years, they are taught about social and 
rural behaviour, how to be self-sufficient, and about the caste system.Then 
come the theories of social and political thinkers and national heroes, as well as 
lectures on agriculture and cattle breeding. The focus of the lessons is the 
environment they live in. The children are taught to make arid land cultivable, 
and the destructive effect of chopping down trees for firewood. Powerful links 
are established between the school and everyday working life". Quotation from 
J-C. KLOTZ, "India: the children's republic", Unesco Sources, No. 116 
(October 1999), p. 6. 
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should recognise their cultural identity, plight and heritage. An 
example would be the teaching of literacy in the child's first 
language45 . 
Usually, basic education is aimed at children within the 
framework of primary schooling. However, basic education is 
also relevant for other persons who lack the basic knowledge and 
skills. This dimension is called fundamental education in terms of 
Article 13(2d) ICESCR. This type of education is rather broad 
and would include, among others, basic literacy and numeracy 
skills, but also basic professional skills which enable people to 
function as a member of society, to take part in social and cultural 
life, to generate income, to participate in projects aimed at 
community development, and to have access to and utilise 
information from a variety of sources (for example, computer 
technologies). The enjoyment of this right is not limited by age or 
gender; it extends to children, youth and adults, including older 
persons; it is an integral component of adult education and life-
long learning46. Providing secondary and other forms of 
education would not belong to the core of the right. These levels 
of education have less priority from the perspective of the essence 
of basic education. 
Primary education as a eore element would also mean that no 
one, for example parents or employers, can withold a child from 
attending primary education47. A state has an obligation to protect 
this right from encroachments by third persons. The obligation of 
the state to pro vide for primary education may be characterized 
both as an obligation of conduct and an obligation of result. 
When seen from the perspective of Article 14 of the Covenant it 
45. See about these aspects F. P. DALL, "Children's Right to Education: 
Reaching the Unreached", in: J. R. HIMES (ed.), Implementing the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child - Resource Mobilization in Low-Income Countries, 
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, UNICEF, 1995, pp. 143-183, at 153,158-163. 
46. General Cornrnent no. 13, para. 23, 24. 
47. See also, General Cornrnent no. 11, para. 6. 
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is an obligation of conduct, because it requires a state to set up 
and work out a plan of action, within two years after becoming a 
Party to the Covenant, for the progressive implementation of 
compulsory primary education free of charge for all within a 
reasonable number of years. On the other hand, it is also an 
obligation of result in terms of meeting basic learning needs 
which may be complied with through a variety of delivery 
systems (e.g. formal or non-formal) and means, providing 
specific levels of knowledge and skills will be realised. 
According to Article 13(2a), primary education shall be 
compulsory. Usually the starting age for compulsory primary 
education is at six or seven, but the duration between countries 
varies considerably. Worldwide there is a trend to lengthen 
compulsory schooling beyond primary schooling. The ratio for a 
minimum duration of compulsory schooling beyond eleven years 
of age is that it should last at least to the minimum age of 
employment48 . Obviously it is not · sufficient that primary 
education is compulsory by law. What is also necessary is an 
official state inspection service to supervise and enforce this duty 
with respect to parents, schools, employers and pupils 
themselves. 
There are a number of factors which may influence actual 
attendance of children at school49. These include inadequacy of 
school services, such as the distance between a student' s home 
and the school, due to lack of transportation facilities, and lack of 
running water and sanitation facilities at school. Other factors 
relate to the socio-economic and cultural status of parents. These 
include inability to pay for school attendance of their children, 
48. See the Progre ss report submitted by Katarina Tomasevski, Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Education, U.N. Doc. E/CNA/2000/6, para. 46 and 
Table 3. 
49. These factors are largely drawn from UNESCO's questionnaire for the 
consultation of Member States on the implementation of the Convention 
against Discrimination in Education, UNESCO Doc. 23 C/72, Annex A (1985). 
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traditional attitudes which downgrade education of girls in 
particular, loss of farnily income that a child attending c1asses 
would otherwise earn, other constraints arising from religion, 
c1ass, occupation or custom and the inability of parents to help 
their children in the learning process. Particular relevant is the 
physical and mental health condition of children which may 
influence school attendance. Other factors which may negatively 
influence school attendance inc1ude teaching given in a language 
other than the child's mother tongue, a school timetable which is 
incompatible with seasonal work by children, particularly in rural 
areas and the phenomenon that teaching material s and methods 
do not fit in with the cultural background of children and their 
parents (adaptability of education). 
Artic1e 13(2a) also stipulates that primary education shall be 
free. The degree to which primary education is really free is 
determined by a number of direct and indirect costs50, such as 
school fees51 , expenses for textbooks and supplÍes, costs for extra 
lessons, expenses for meals at school canteens, expenses for 
school transport, school uniforms or other items of c10thing and 
footwear, medical expenses and boarding fees, where applicable. 
In sorne countries it is practice that the village cornmunity or 
parents provide labour for constructing, running or maintaining 
the school; this may be seen as a form of indirect costs for those 
involved. Another form of indirect costs for parents is taxation. 
Through the fiscal policy of the state, families contribute to the 
costs of education. Its effects upon the accessibilty of education 
will depend upon the progressiveness of the tax-system: do low-
50. This paragragh is also based on UNESCO's questionnaire. 
51. According to the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, 
"school fees represent a form of regressive taxation. Their justification 
routinely points to the inability (or unwillingness) of a Government to generate 
sufficient revenue through general taxation. Payment for primary schooling 
ruptures the key principIe of taxation whereby people who cannot contribute to 
public services that are meant for all are not required to do so". U.N. Doc. 
E/CN .4/2000/6, para. 52. See al so CESCR, General Comment no. 11, para. 7. 
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income groups pay less, in absolute and relative terrns, compared 
to high-income groups?52 One should also look into the effects of 
IMF Structural Adjustment Prograrnrnes and Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers upon the accessibility of education if an increase 
in education fees is part of the package of measures agreed 
between the government concerned and the IME It is then 
important to know whether financial or other forrns of assistance 
or compensatory measures are available for underprivileged 
persons and groups to safeguard continued access to education as 
a human right53. 
Primary education must have priority in resource allocation, 
because it deals with the fundamental basis for a person's 
development and the development of society as a whole54. This 
would be in line with the idea of a core content of rights which 
should be seen as a bottom or floor from which states should 
endeavour to go up. It is the responsibility of the state to provide 
for primary education and maintain educational services. A go-
vernment cannot waive that responsibility by giving more room 
to the private sector, or stimulating public-private partnerships for 
financing the educational infrastructure55. With respect to the 
right to education in the European Convention, the Strassbourg 
Court held that a State cannot ábsolve itself from responsibility 
52. See the background paper prepared by Ms. Katarina Tomasevski, 
Special Rapporteur on the right to education of the Cornmission on Human 
Rights, U.N. Doc. E/C. 12/1998/18, para. 12. 
53. See the report on the mission to Uganda by the U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Education, U.N. Doc. E/CNA/2000/6/Add.l , para. 
29-34. 
54. See also in this respect, General Comment no. 13, para. 51: "States 
parties are obliged to prioritise the introduction of compulsory, free education". 
55. In a number of African countries, state monopoly on education is 
coming to an end. In addition, there is a tendency to involve the private 
(business) sector in the funding and building of schools. The privatization of 
education is supported, and sometimes even imposed, by the IMF and the 
World Bank within the framework of structural adjustrnent prograrnmes. See 
about this development, UNESCO Sources, no. 102, June 1998, pp. 12, 13. 
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by delegating its obligations to private school bodies56. In its 
General Cornrnent on Artiele 13 ICESCR, the CESCR has 
stressed that 'Artiele 13 regards States as having principal 
responsibility for the direct provision of education in most 
circumstances'57. It has also stressed that States have an 
immediate duty to provide primary education for all58. For those 
States that have not realised yet compulsory and free primary 
education, there is an 'unequivocal obligation' to adopt and 
implement a detailed plan of action as provided for in Artiele 
1459. 
Special facilities for persons with an educational back-log 
Related to the aspects discussed aboye is another element of 
the social dimension of the right to education which, in my view, 
would be long to its core content. This concerns the obligation for 
the State to take special measures or provide special facilities for 
those persons who are faced with an educational back-Iog, or who 
would otherwise have no access to education at all without those 
special facilities. One can think of girls in rural areas, street and 
working children, children and adults displaced by war or internal 
strife and disabled persons60. The type of education to be given to 
these people should be geared for their specific educational needs 
and will often require specially trained teachers. 
56. Case of Costello-Roberts v. UK, Judgment of 25 March 1993, Pub!. 
Court Series A, Vol. 247-C, para. 27. 
57. General Comment no. 13, para. 48. 
58. General Comment no. 13, para. 51. 
59. General Comment no. 11, para. 9. 
60. Compare Artiele 3 Jomtien Deelaration. See also the Statement to the 
World Conference on Human Rights on behalf of the Committee on Econornic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. NCONF.157/PC/62/Add.5, Annex 1. 
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Quality of education 
Another core element of the right to education which is less 
concrete and consequently more difficult to assess is a certain 
quality of education for each separate educational level. A State 
party is under an obligation to provide and maintain this quality, 
otherwise attending elasses would be meaningless. When 
assessing this quality, a State should take into account various 
factors, such as the results of student' s tests, the efforts and 
training-Ievel of teachers, the availability and quality of teaching 
materials, the condition of schoolbuildings etc. The quality level 
of education should also encompass standards regarding the 
purposes of education as defined in Artiele 13 (1) ICESCR and 
Artiele 29( 1) CRC. The level of quality is to be determined by the 
national educational authorities and supervised by an independent 
educational inspection unit. 
Free choice of education 
Still another element of the core content of the right to 
education is free choice of education without interference by the 
State or a third person, in particular, but not exelusively with 
regard to religious or philosophical convictions. This element 
would be violated in case a State fails to respect the free choice of 
parents with regard to the religious instruction of their children61 . 
This means, in practice, that a state must ensure an objective and 
pluralist curriculum and avoid indoctrination62. This is important, 
61. See COOMANS (1992), at 39, 238. 
62. Case of Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen, (1976), Judgment of the 
European Court of Human Rights, Series A, Vol. 23, at 26, 27. The Court 
emphasised that Artiele 2 of the First Protocol should be interpreted in the light 
of Artiele 8 (right to privacy), Artiele 9 (freedom of conscience and religion) 
and Artiele 10 (freedom to receive information) of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. 
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because public education entails the danger of poli tic al goals, i.e. 
the most influential 'philosophy of life' will be promoted by the 
State63. However, it should be realised that in many countries 
there is only limited or no opportunity to attend education of 
one's own choice: either there is only state-controled education, 
or in a mixed system, private education is too expensive for 
parents64. On the basis of intemational human rights law, there is 
no obligation for a State to provide financial support to private 
educational institutions. If it does, however, it should do so on a 
non-discriminatory basis65 . 
These core elements undoubtedly constitute the very essence 
of the right to education as a human right. Violation of one or 
more of these elements by the State would entail that the right 
would lose its material and intrinsic value as a human right. 
The right to be educated in the language of one' s own choice , 
A more controversial question is whether the right to be 
educated in the language of one' s own choice is part of the core 
content of the right to education. In the Belgian Linguistic Case, 
the European Court on Human Rights stated that 'the right to 
education would be meaningless if it did not imply, in favour of 
its beneficiaries, the right to be educated in the national language 
or in one of the nationallanguages, as the case may be'66. This 
63. Compare Artiele 17(3) Afrícan Charter on Human Rights and Peoples' 
Rights which states: 'The promotion and protection of morals and traditional 
values recognized by the cornmunity shall be the duty of the State'. 
64. Prívate education means: educational institutions established and run 
by prívate individuals or organizations. These prívate institutions may be 
partially or fully funded by the State, or altematively, receive no financial 
contributions from whatever local, regional or national public authority. 
65. See the views of the Human Rights Cornmittee in the case of Arieh 
Hollis Waldman v. Canada (1999), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/67/D/1996. 
66. Belgian Linguistic Case (1968), Judgment of the European Court of 
Human Rights, Seríes A, Vol. 6, at 31. 
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means that it is the State that determines whether a specific 
language is to be a national or official language as a medium of 
instruction in education. In addition, the Court stressed that an 
individual cannot c1aim a right to State-funded education in the 
language of his own choice. The Court rejected positive state 
action for rewarding such a c1aim67. 
On the other hand, it is submitted that a State must respect the 
freedom of individuals to teach, for instance, a minority language 
in schools established and directed by members of that minority. 
This does not imply, however, that a State must allow the use of 
this language as the only medium of instruction; this would be 
dependent on the educational policy of the State. As a minimum, 
however, states must not frustrate the right of members of 
national, ethnic or linguistic minorities to be taught in their 
mother tongue at institutions outside the official system of public 
education. However, there is no state obligation to fund these 
institutions. This right of members of minorities is solidly 
established in intemational law68. It used to be a comerstone of 
the minority protection system established under the auspices of 
the League of Nations. Moreover, the right of minorites to 
establish, for their own account, educational institutions in which 
67. Compare the critical observations of the Committee on Econornic, 
Social and Cultural Rights when it discussed the periodic report of Mauritius 
on the implementation of the ICESCR. The Comrnittee noted with concem that 
Kreol and Bhojpuri, the only languages spoken by the large majority of the 
population, are not used in the Mauritian educational system. See U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1994/8, para. 16. 
68. See, for example, Artiele 27 Intemational Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Paragraphs 32-34 of the Document of the Copenhagen 
Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (1990), and 
Artiele 4 of the Deelaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (UN General Assembly Res. 
47/135 (18 Dec. 1992)). See also, within the context of the Council of Europe, 
Artiele 8 of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (1992) 
and Artieles 12-14 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities (1994). 
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they are entitled to use their own language, was characterized by 
the Pennanent Court of Intemational Justice as 'indispensable to 
enable the minority to enjoy the same treatment as the majority, 
not only in law but also in fact'. The Court considered these 
institutions as 'suitable means for the preservation of their racial 
peculiarities, their traditions and their national characteristics' 69. 
It is in this sense that the right to be educated in the language of 
one's own choice belongs to the core content of the right to 
education. It is one of the elements of a State's obligation to 
respect that right. 
4.3 Peripheral elements 
Other elements within the scope of Artiele 13 ICESCR would, 
in my view, not belong to the core content, but should be 
characterized as peripheral elements. General availability of 
different fonns of secondary education, ineluding vocational 
guidance and training, and higher education would belong to this 
peripheral part of the scope of the right to education. The same 
elassification would apply to the progressive introduction of free 
secondary and higher education (compare Artiele 13(2b and c) 
ICESCR, 28(2b and c) CRC. Other examples of peripheral 
elements inelude providing access to specific educational 
69. Permanent Court of International Justice, Minority Schools in Albania, 
Advisory Opinion of 6 Apri11935, Series AIB No. 64; text in: HUDSON, World 
Court Reports, vol. 3 (1938), pp. 484-512, at 499, 496. For a more recent 
example, see the observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights concerning the realisation of the right to education of members 
of the Gypsy minority in Romania. The Comrnittee noted that Gypsies 
continued to face discrimination in schools. The Committee recommended the 
Romanian Government to adopt an active non-discrimination policy with 
respect to this rninority, to encourage their participation in culturallife and to 
assure proper participation in educational activities by children belonging to 
that group. See U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1994/4, para. 12, 15. 
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information to help to ensure the health and well-being of 
families, ineluding information on family planning (Artiele 10(h) 
CEDA W); promoting education of refugees (Artiele 22(2) 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees); and promoting 
the instruction of children belonging to indigenous peoples in 
their own indigenous language (Artiele 28(1) ILO Convention no. 
169). Although these elements are important for the full 
realisation and enjoyment of the right to education, they are less 
essential from the perspective of the fundamental values 
embodied in the right to education. In a way, these elements may 
be seen as derivative of the core elaim and guarantee of the right 
to education. Other elements are even more remote from the core 
of the right to education. These elements inelude the introduction 
and maintenance of an adequate fellowship system, adequate 
material conditions for the teaching staff, and the availability of a 
coherent overall system of schools at all levels (local, regional 
and national). In addition, setting up a system for educational and 
vocational information and guidance (Artiele 28(2d) CRC), in my 
view, also belongs to this part of the scope of the right to 
education. Another example is the obligation to develop and 
implement education programmes for indigenous and tribal 
peoples, in cooperation with these peoples, in order to address 
their specific educational needs and to preserve and promote the 
practice of indigenous languages (Artiele 27(1), 28(3) ILO 
Convention No. 169). A final example is the obligation for a State 
party to eliminate any stereotyped roles of men and women in 
educational types and programmes (Artiele 10(c) CEDAW). The 
components mentioned here do not touch directly upon the core 
of the right as defined aboye, but are more remote from the 
essence of this right. Consequently, state obligations resulting 
from these elements are not minimum obligations. 
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5. A TYPOLOGY OF OBLIGATIONS RELATING TO THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION 
In order to further analyse and specify the norrnative content of 
the right to education and the nature and content of the 
corresponding obligations of the S tate , I propose to follow an 
obligations approach developed in the acadernic debate. To be 
more specific, it is suggested to develop a typology of State 
obligations as an analytical tool to provide a better understanding 
of the scope and nature of these obligations in the process of 
realisation of econornic, social and cultural rights and the right to 
education in particular. Part of the traditional view about 
implementation of these rights was that they only give rise to 
positive obligations, while civil and political rights embody only 
negative obligations for the State. However, it has been 
recognised increasingly that all human rights give rise to multiple 
types of duties, or put differently, to a spectrum of duties. The full 
protection of a human right, whether civil, political, econornic, 
social or cultural, requires compliance with different duties, both 
positive and negative ones. Obligations are interdependent and 
interrelated, aimed at the full realisation of a right. The idea of a 
typology of obligations has been developed by the American 
political philosopher Henry Shue in his book Basic Rights70. Is 
was elaborated further by different human rights scholars, one of 
them being the Norwegian human rights expert Asbjom Eide71 . 
He identified three levels of obligations with respect to the 
implementation of the right to foodn . He distinguished between 
70. H. SHUE, Basic Rights - Subsistence, Affluence and U.S. Foreign 
Policy, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press 1980, second edition 
1996. 
71. See for an extensive discussion of this development, M. SEPÚLVEDA, 
The Nature 01 the Obligations under the Intemational Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2003, chapter V. 
n. A. Eide, The Right to Adequate Food as a Human Right, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987123, para. 66-71. For a more recent discussion of the levels 
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the obligations 'to respect', 'to protect' and 'to fulfil', which 
States parties to the ICESCR have towards individuals under their 
jurisdiction. This typology of state obligations is also applied in 
recent General Comments of the CESCR, such as the cornments 
on the right to food and the right to education 73. The first level is 
the 'obligation to respect'. This obligation prohibits the State 
itself to act in contravention of recognised rights and freedoms. 
This means that the State must refrain from interfering with or 
constraining the exercise of such rights and freedoms. The second 
level is the 'obligation to protect'. This requires the State to take 
steps - through legislation or by other means - to prevent and 
prohibit the violation of individual rights and freedoms by third 
persons. The third level concerns the 'obligation to fulfil'. This 
obligationmay be characterized as a prograrnme obligation and 
implies more of a long-term view for its implementation. In 
general, this will require a financial input which cannot be 
accomplished by individual s alone. This typology of obligations 
is applicable to economic, social and cultural rights as well as to 
civil and political rights. It demonstrates that the realisation of a 
particular right may require either abstention and intervention on 
the part of governments. On the basis of Eide's proposal for a 
'food security matrix'74, it is possible to devise a comparable 
matrix to identify the nature and levels of obligations relating to 
the implementation of the right to education. The matrix is 
presented as an appendix to this artiele. The matrix distinguishes 
between the 'social' dimension and the 'freedom' dimension of 
the right to education, discussed aboye. Within each dimension, a 
further itemisation is proposed. The 'social' dimension ineludes 
of state obligations, see A. EIDE, "Economic and Social Rights", in: 
J. SYMONIDES (ed.), Human Rights: Concept and Standards, Aldershot, 
Ashgate-Dartmouth and UNESCO Publishing, 2000, pp. 109-174, at 124-128. 
73. See General Comment no. 12, para. 15 and General Comment no. 13, 
para. 46-50. 
74. EIDE (1987), at p. 29. 
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the elements of accessibility and availability of education, 
whereas the 'freedom' dimension refers to the liberty to choose 
and the liberty to establish. The proposed matrix does not offer an 
exhaustive list of concrete State action, but merely serves as an 
illustration of possible options for States. Other forms of conduct 
or measures can be put in, depending on the educational situation 
in each country. The matrix is applicable to both developing 
countries with an inadequate educational system and to countries 
in which there is a highly developed sytem of education. It is a 
device for the elaboration and elarification of the scope and 
nature of obligations and it can help to determine whether a 
State's legislation, policy and practice are in conformity with its 
obligations under the Covenant. The nature of the obligations 
remains the same; only the measures taken to implement the 
obligations differ. In rich countries, for example, it is necessary to 
maintain the existing level of education in a quantitative and 
qualitative sense, because a drop in services would endanger the 
accessibility and availability of education. 
The following examples illustrate how the matrix can be 
applied75. The obligation 'to respect' the right to education 
requires the State to abstain from interference. It must not prevent 
children from attending education, for example byelosing 
educational institutions in times of political tension in non-
conformity with the limitations elause of Artiele 4 ICESCR76. In 
addition, it requires that the State does not discrirninate on the 
basis of sex or ethnic origin, with respect to adrnission to public 
schools. Detailed standards of non-discrimination and equal 
treatment of individual s in education are laid down in the 
UNESCO Convention against Discrirnination in Education 
(1960), particularly in Artieles 1 and 3. The obligation 'to 
respect' can be characterised as an obligation of conduct: it 
75. For other examples see, General Comment no. 13, para. 50. 
76. General Comment no. 13, para. 59. 
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requires the State to follow the course of action specified in the 
treaiy provision77. The obligation 'to protect' requires the State to 
guarantee the exercise of the right to education in horizontal 
relations (between private groups or individuals), for example, it 
must protect against discrimination in admitting students to 
private schools. Another example of the obligation to protect is 
the adoption and enforcement of legislation to combat child or 
bonded labour in private labour relations, or arrangements for 
monitoring and enforcing compulsory primary education. 
The nature of the right to education is such that positive State 
action is needed to achieve the full realisation of this right. In the 
opinion of the CESCR, 'it is clear that Article 13 regards States as 
having principal responsibilty for the direct provision of 
education in most circumstances'78, which can be seen as an 
elaboration of the obligation to fulfil. The obligation 'to fulfil' 
requires States to make the various types of education available 
and accessible for all and to maintain that level of realisation. In 
order to achieve that aim, States must take a variety of measures. 
Although legislation may be necessary to provide a legal 
framework, primarily, policy measures, financial and material 
support are needed to realise this right79. The obligation 'to fulfil' 
implies that States have a substantial degree of latitude in 
complying, depending also upon the specific level of education 
and taking into account the wording ofthe treaty obligation80. For 
example, primary education shail be compulsory and available 
free to ail (Article 13(2)(a)) versus the progressive introduction 
of free secondary education (Article 13(2)(b)) ICESCR. Imple-
77. See COOMANS (1992), at 231, 232 and M. NOWAK, "The Right to 
Education - Its Meaning, Significance and Limitations", in: Netherlands 
Quarterly of Human Rights, 9 (1991), pp. 418-425, at 421,422. 
78. General Comment no. 13, para. 48. 
79. See the Limburg PrincipIes, no. 17. Legislative measures would be 
imperative if existing legislation is contrary to the obligations under the 
Covenant; see Limburg Principies, no. 18. 
80. General Comment no. 13, para. 48. 
EXPLORING THE NORMATIVE CONTENT OF THE RIGHTS ro EDUCATION 97 
mentation of the ·latter c1ause gives more latitude to the state than 
the former. Therefore, the obligation 'to fulfil' should be 
characterised as an obligation of result, leaving the choice of 
means to the State, providing the result achieved conforms to 
intemational standards. 
Minimum eore Obligations 
It can be seen from the matrix that speeific elements of the 
eore contentof the right to edueation give rise to concrete 
obligations. These obligations may be eharaeterised as mínimum 
core obligations (m.e.o.); as defined by the CESCR in its General 
Comment on the nature of States parties obligations81 . Sueh 
obligations are not limíted to eost-free (negative) obligations to 
respect, but also inc1ude positive obligations to proteet and to 
fulfil. Mínimum core obligations resulting from the eore eontent 
of the right to edueation apply irrespective of the availability of 
resources82. It is interesting to note that the CESCR also briefly 
refers to the eore content eoneept in its General Comment on 
Artic1e 13, but framed in terms of eore obligations for the state, 
echoing the wording of General Comment no. 3 on the nature of 
states' obligations. Aeeording to the Committee, the mínimum 
eore obligation with respect to the right to edueation inc1udes an 
obligation: 'to ensure the right of aecess to public edueational 
institutions and programmes on a non-discrimínatory basis; to 
ensure that edueation eonforms to the objectives set out in artic1e 
13(1); to provide primary edueation for all in aceordance with 
artic1e 13(2)(a); to adopt and implement a national educational 
81. General Comment no. 3, para. 10. 
82. "Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights", Human Rights Quarterly 20 (1998), pp. 691-704, para. 9. See also 
V. DANKWA, C. FLINTERMAN, S. LECKIE, "Commentary to the Maastricht 
Guidelines on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights", Human Rights Quarterly 
20 (1998), pp. 705-730, at 717. 
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strategy which ineludes provision for secondary higher and 
fundamental education; and to ensure free choice of education 
without interference from the State or third parties, subject to 
conformity with "minimum educational standards" (artiele 13(3) 
and (4»'83. There is elearly overlap with the core elements I 
discussed aboye, but there are also differences, such as the 
reference to the objectives of education mentioned in Artiele 13 
(1), an element which I left out, because in my view it would be 
covered by the quality level of education. The CESCR elearly 
decided to retain the 'obligations' language used in General 
Comment no. 3. In practical terms, however, there seems to be 
little difference between the core content approach on the one 
hand, and the core obligations approach on the other, because 
core elements of rights of individuals need to be translated into 
core obligations for the state. However, it may be argued that it is 
crucial to retain as a point of departure the right of the individual, 
rather than the obligations of the S tate , because the latter derive 
from the right, at least from a human rights perspective. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This artiele contains an effort, from a legal perspective, to shed 
more light on the normative content of the right to education. 
Contributions from other disciplines are necessary, because many 
activities and measures dealing with the implementation of this 
right will be of an administrative, financial or pedagogical nature. 
It should be emphasised here that the core contentlcore 
obligations approach is rather recent and still in a stage of 
development and elaboration. Important questions remain, such 
as the degree of specificity required for core elements to be 
workable. There is also a risk that identifying core elements of a 
83. General Cornment no. 13, para. 57. 
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right and corresponding minimum obligations might lead to a 
neglect of peripheral elements of the same right and to an 
underrnining of the universal character of that right. However, it 
is my opinion that the search for core elements of economic, 
social and cultural rights and minimum obligations serves, first of 
all, analytical purposes. From a human rights perspective, it is of 
the utmost importance to c1arify (vague) treaty norms in order to 
make c1ear to governments what the precise meaning is of treaty 
obligations that they have accepted voluntarily, and next to 
scrutinise acts and omissions of governments in terms of 
observance of these rights and obligations. In addition, it is 
important to assist monitoring bodies, both at the intergo~ 
vernmental and non~governmental level, in their work to identify 
violations and to request governments to redress those violations 
and to alter their legislation and policy~practice. Finally, 
c1arification of rights and obligations in the field of economic, 
social and cultural rights may contri bu te to strengthening the 
justiciability of these rights at the national and internationallevel. 
After all, from a perspective of equality, interdependence and 
indivisibility of human rights, the overall aim should be to 
strengthen the legal character of economic, social and cultural 
rights which, unfortunately, have been neglected too long. 
Matrix of state obligations relating to the right to education 
Dimensions of the SOCIAL DIMENSION FREEDOM DIMENSION 
right to education (The right to receive an education) (The right to choose an education) 
Nature of state ACCESSlliILITY AVAILABILITY LIBERTY TO CHOOSE LIBERTY TO EST ABLISH 
obligations 
Respect free access to public Respect existing public edu- Respect religious and phi loso- Respect free establishment of 
education both in legislation, cation in minority languages; phical convictions (granting private schools (subject to le-
policy and practice without exemption), gal minimum standards); 
TORESPECT discrimination [m.c.o); Respect freedom of school Respect (cultural) diversity in 
choice, education; 
Respect human dignity, Res-
pect teaching in minority lan-
guages [m.c.o); 
Apply and uphold equal access Regulate recognition of pri- Combat indoctrination or co- Apply and uphold the princi-
to education in legislation, po- vate educational institutions ercion by others; Protect lega- pie of equality of treatment; 
licy and practice against viola- and diplomas; lIy freedom to choose [m.c.o); Protect legally private 
TOPROTECT tions by third persons (parents, Combat discrimination in the teachers' training institutions 
employers) admission of students to pri- and diplomas; 
Adopt and implement legis- vate institutions; 
lation against child labour Guarantee pluralism in the 
curriculum; 
Provide special educational fa- Secure compulsory and free Promote pluralism in the cu- Provide financial and material 
cilities for persons with an edu- primary education [m.c.o); rriculum; support to institutions for pri-
cational back-Iog (e.g. the disa- Train teachers; Promote intercultural edu- vate education on a non-discri-
bled, girls, drop-outs, street Make transportation facilities cation; minatory basis; 
TOFULFIL children) [m.c.o); Eliminate and teaching material s avai-
passive discrimination; lable; 
Introduce progressively free se- Combat iIIiteracy; 
condary and higher education; Promote adult education; 
Promote scholarship system; Guarantee quality of education 
[m.c.o); 
m.c.o = minimum core obligation 
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